Search results

Corporate misconduct carries significant social and economic costs, and therefore regulators and other stakeholders seek to deter it. Despite the significant costs and deterrence efforts, corporate misconduct is widespread and our understanding of it is limited. As argued in this chapter, one key reason for this is the lack of understanding of the benefits and penalties of misconduct for the companies and individuals involved, as well as the detection of such behavior. This chapter seeks to advance our understanding of corporate misconduct and builds on the rational choice model (RCM) – where the decision to engage in misconduct hinges on a calculation of the expected costs and benefit – and links it to research in organization theory and strategy. Specifically, it sets a research agenda at the intersection of organizational and strategic perspectives, to deepen our understanding of corporate misconduct and shed light on opportunities for empirical and theoretical research which can potentially aid in developing effective deterrence strategies.

Corporate crime is prevalent and imposes enormous costs on society, yet our understanding of its antecedents remains poor, especially in relation to executive characteristics. In this study, we examine the influence of CEO childhood social class on corporate crime. Using a unique data set of CEOs at the largest US corporations, we consider CEO childhood background and develop the argument individuals raised in middle-class families have a greater disposition to commit wrongdoing within the corporations they lead. Specifically, growing up middle-class leaves a lasting status-anxiety imprint, which increases the tendency to engage in corporate crime to preserve or enhance social status. Furthermore, we show two status-anxiety-minimizing factors – Ivy League education and membership in a prominent golf club – weaken the effect of middle-class upbringing on corporate crime. Our findings suggest childhood social class has significant explanatory power for executive behavior and corporate outcomes.

Firm identities are central and enduring aspects of organizations. However, when firms develop unique identities, they also face an obvious paradox: strategic decisions that are inconsistent with those identities are likely to generate internal and external resistance. Indeed, decisions that entail identity-violating changes may have destabilizing consequences. Furthermore, firms typically face the demand of multiple audiences (or stakeholders) and, therefore, must conform to them in order to be seen as legitimate and have access to symbolic and material resources. Recognizing the influence of multiple audiences in identity construction opens the door to another paradox: what expectations should a firm heed while making those binding commitments that ultimately define its “identity”? These two paradoxes are at the heart of extant research on organizational identity, and addressing them requires a genuine engagement in conversations between disciplines, particularly among scholars working at the intersection between organization theory and strategy.